Review of Afghanistan developments
Over the course of more than three years since the Taliban reestablished their authority in Afghanistan, various reports have emerged regarding the presence of foreign armed factions within the nation, with Jamaat Ansarullah Tajikistan being one of the most notable. This group was established in 2006 by Amrudin Tabrov, also referred to as Mullah Amruddin who was subsequently killed by Afghan government forces in 2016.
Jamaat Ansarullah, occasionally called the Tajik Taliban for specific political ends, has not provided any commentary on the name change. This group was identified as a terrorist organization subsequent to a terrorist attack that took place in Khujand, Tajikistan.
In the aftermath of the Taliban‘s ascendance in Afghanistan, a variety of reports regarding Jamaat Ansarullah have been released. Notably, reports from the United Nations Security Council are frequently cited as authoritative sources for expert assessments and news articles. These documents predominantly concentrate on emphasizing and detailing the activities and influence of Jamaat Ansarullah within Afghanistan under Taliban rule.
For example a recent report from the UN Security Council indicates that Jamaat Ansarullah operates training camps in Khost province, overseen by Al-Qaeda instructors. Additionally, they claimed that the group has set up a specialized military facility in Takhar province aimed at training fighters from Central Asia. Or the Security Council Monitoring Team has reported that Jamaat Ansarullah has formed a unit in Kunduz province with the intent to infiltrate border regions. The report also asserts that the Taliban government has deployed a suicide unit in Badakhshan province, where Jamaat Ansarullah forces are active, utilizing this group for operations against anti-government resistance factions.
Verification of Jamaat Ansarullah activities in Afghanistan
While the Taliban has a record of working alongside various foreign organizations, its tactics in the year prior to its victory, and notably after reclaiming governance over Afghanistan, reflect a trend towards imposing constraints on these entities.
In 2020, preceding the Taliban’s victory by one year, the group crafted a guideline intended for its foreign armed contingents, which was later published by various media outlets. This guideline requires that foreign armed groups fully submit to the authority of the local Taliban commander in their designated area, and any movement of their members to alternative locations is only permissible with the necessary approval.
After the Taliban’s triumph and the formation of their government, the scrutiny of foreign armed groups increased considerably. Credible and objective journalists have indicated that the Ansarullah Jamaat and the East Turkestan Movement were transferred from provinces that border Tajikistan and China to provinces that do not share a border with these nations.
The Taliban government has persistently maintained in its official communications that it adheres to the principle of non-aggression towards other nations from Afghanistan. In practice, there is no verifiable evidence that this principle has been violated, with the notable exception of the dynamics involving Pakistan and the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, which is a separate concern. The leaders of the Taliban recognize that the survival and ongoing governance of their administration are more dependent on their fidelity to this principle than on any other elements.
In addition to this rationale, the Taliban government has pursued a strategy focused on enhancing economic ties at the regional level. As a result, the rise of factions such as Jamaat Ansarullah, which endangers Afghanistan’s interactions with its regional counterparts, represents a serious infringement on the strategy of fostering regional economic collaboration. Throughout the last three and a half years, the Taliban has sought to cultivate a regionalist identity for their governance, with a notable emphasis on Central Asian countries.
Moreover, Badakhshan province in northeastern Afghanistan holds a pivotal economic and political significance for the Taliban government. The Taliban has made considerable strides in advancing the Wakhan Corridor, with the objective of connecting Afghanistan to China. In this endeavor, the Taliban has built a dirt road along the corridor despite facing economic pressures and is in regular discussions with Chinese officials to secure Beijing’s consent for its opening. To effectively capture China’s interest in the Wakhan Corridor, it is crucial that Badakhshan province is safe and devoid of terrorist factions.
Evidence from the field does not support the assertion that the Taliban has transferred control of Afghanistan’s territory to foreign armed organizations, especially the Ansarullah Movement of Tajikistan, nor does it indicate that these groups are operating openly within Afghanistan.
In disputing this analysis, one might refer to the endeavors of an Ansarullah member, namely Mohammad Sharifov or Mehdi Arsalan, who released videos illustrating his activities and the forces he led in the districts of Koufab, Khwan, Mayimi, Nasi, and Sheki in the border province of Badakhshan. It can be inferred with considerable certainty that this maneuver was intended as a message from Kabul to Dushanbe, indicating that if the National Resistance Front of Afghanistan is permitted to operate in Dushanbe, the Ansarullah group could also establish a presence on the Tajik border. Following negotiations and agreements between security officials from Kabul and Dushanbe, this Ansarullah member subsequently vanished from public view, and there have been no further updates regarding him.
Sources of reports about the Ansarullah group
At this time, there are two main categories of reports related to Jamaat Ansarullah Tajikistan. The first category consists of reports from media sources that are critical of the Taliban government, as well as from opposition members who have been issuing these reports for the past three years, asserting that they have access to local sources.
The second category involves the report produced by the UN Security Council Monitoring Team. Due to the team’s inability to conduct field research, the report is compiled primarily from interviews with individuals living outside Afghanistan. This reliance on external sources has led to considerable doubts about the report’s accuracy, with some members of the US intelligence community questioning the reliability of the Security Council Monitoring Team’s assessments.
Alternatively, some regional specialists argue that the key source of information in the monitoring team’s report comes from Pakistani officials. Given the prevailing hostility between Kabul and Islamabad, these officials may be motivated to disseminate biased information to cast the Taliban government in a negative light regarding its purported backing of terrorist groups.
Following the Taliban’s ascension to power in Afghanistan, an examination of the reports from the monitoring team indicates that the team has sought to leverage its authority to depict a grim portrayal of the situation in Afghanistan, seeking to provoke the international community through the exaggeration of terrorist group activities.
Aside from these arguments, the progress in the relationship between the Taliban government and the Tajik authorities is evident, particularly through the softened rhetoric of Tajik President Emomali Rahmon towards the Taliban. This change indicates that Dushanbe has developed a certain level of confidence regarding the Ansarullah group. If Tajikistan had not attained such confidence, its stance towards Kabul would likely have remained stringent and adversarial. Instead, the activities of the Taliban’s opponents within Tajikistan appear to have diminished, as various reports indicate that the National Resistance Front’s operations have been limited. Additionally, there are indications that a diplomat from the Taliban government may soon be stationed at the Afghan embassy in Dushanbe.
Nevertheless, the uptick in reports and analyses concerning Jamaat Ansarullah’s activities in Afghanistan could potentially be an attempt to disrupt the progress made in their bilateral relations.
To conclude, it is important to note that although the presence of Ansarullah Movement members from Tajikistan in Afghanistan cannot be entirely dismissed, the stated policies of the Taliban government and available field evidence imply that allegations concerning the group’s activities in Afghanistan are unfounded and serve political ends. Such psychological maneuvers extend beyond the Ansarullah Movement, encompassing the East Turkestan Movement and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan as well.
