Review of Afghanistan developments
Recently, a ceremony was conducted to introduce “Saniullah Farahmand” as the special representative and ambassador of the Taliban government to Turkey. This event took place at the Afghan embassy in Ankara and was presided over by Amir Khan Muttaqi, the acting foreign minister. During the introduction of the Taliban government’s ambassador, the acting foreign minister declared that relations between Kabul and Ankara have normalized. Furthermore, Muttaqi referred to the ambassador’s introduction to Turkey as a significant accomplishment.
The appointment of the Taliban government’s ambassador to Turkey suggests, from one viewpoint, an advancement in the relations between the Taliban government and Turkey. However, the nature of Turkey’s engagement with the Taliban government prompts several inquiries. Specifically, how does Turkey perceive the Taliban? What does Turkey anticipate from its interactions with the Taliban government, and what is the rationale behind Turkey’s simultaneous pursuit of two distinct forms of engagement with Afghanistan? This article aims to address these inquiries.
Turkey and the delayed acceptance of the ambassador from the Taliban government
During the US-NATO conflict in Afghanistan, Turkey stood out as the sole Islamic nation with an active military presence opposing the Taliban. In spite of this unfavorable history, Turkey was one of the few nations that maintained its embassy in Kabul after the Taliban regained control in August 2020. Turkey initiated its de facto acknowledgment of the Taliban administration by welcoming diplomats from the Taliban government at its consulate in Istanbul towards 2021, and political recognition was further solidified by transferring the Afghan embassy in Ankara to the Taliban representative at the conclusion of 2024. Currently, with the acceptance of the Taliban government’s ambassador in Turkey, the relationship between Ankara and Kabul has entered a new chapter.
An analysis of this process reveals that Turkey has made gradual progress in its engagement with the Taliban. The acceptance of the ambassador after a four-year hiatus serves as a testament to this. Furthermore, Turkey stands out as the sole nation in the region hosting a majority of the high-ranking officials from the former Afghan government, who are now viewed as adversaries of the Taliban. In addition to the presence of some opposition members to the Taliban regime in Turkey, the Turkish government has permitted them to conduct political activities aimed at opposing the Taliban. Among these individuals are notable figures such as Abdul Rashid Dostum, the Uzbek leader of the anti-Taliban opposition, who holds a firmly anti-Taliban stance.
Indeed, Turkey stands out as the sole nation that has engaged in bilateral interactions while simultaneously maintaining relations with the Taliban government and accommodating its opponents. Conversely, Turkey stands out as the sole country in the region that has not seen any senior Turkish officials travel to Afghanistan since the Taliban reestablished control over the country. In contrast, numerous high-ranking officials from the Taliban government have traveled to Turkey. Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, who serves as the Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs, is the most senior Taliban official to have visited Turkey to date.
The reception of the Taliban government’s ambassador in Turkey occurred after several countries, including Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Pakistan, China, Russia, Iran, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, and Norway, had already welcomed the ambassador much earlier than Ankara. This slow and hesitant approach by Ankara in fostering relations with Kabul, exemplified by the delayed reception of the Taliban ambassador, raises questions, especially when juxtaposed with Kabul’s eagerness and efforts to establish extensive ties with Turkey. It is certainly understandable that the Taliban government seeks to enhance its relations with Turkey or any other nation; however, why is Turkey reluctant towards the Taliban government and has been slow in approaching it? On the other hand, why does it engage with both the Taliban government and its opponents?
Possible reasons for Turkey ‘s delay in relations with the Taliban government
Three potential options can be considered in this context.
One potential interpretation is that Ankara is attempting to subtly convey its dissatisfaction with the structure of the Taliban government. Considering Turkey’s focus on the Turkic community in the region, the absence of an Afghan Turk in the highest echelons of government could explain Turkey’s tepid involvement with the Taliban administration. In light of this Turkic concern, the ambassador of the Taliban government to Turkey has been presented as a Turkmen.
the second potential explanation is that Ankara is seeking to give precedence to its economic relations with Afghanistan rather than its political ties. Consequently, it is rapidly advancing its economic engagements while proceeding cautiously and gradually in the realm of political relations. It is possible that Ankara has demoted the Afghan matter to a lower position of importance due to its priorities shaped by the surrounding context, including the situation in Syria.
The third potential scenario is that Ankara is employing this strategy as a means of exerting pressure on the Taliban to engage in negotiations with Afghan leaders located in Ankara, with the intention of integrating these leaders into the Afghan government. In this context, the acceptance of the Taliban government’s ambassador could represent an additional measure by Ankara to establish a dependency of the Taliban government on itself or, alternatively, a constructive interaction aimed at persuading the Taliban government to comply with its demands.
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In conclusion, it can be stated that Ankara’s recognition of the Taliban government’s ambassador may serve as a signal for the Taliban to give greater consideration to Turkey’s requests, particularly those highlighted in the third scenario. While Turkey possesses numerous opportunities and mechanisms to protect its interests in Afghanistan, which the Taliban do not oppose, the involvement of Turks within the Afghan power framework could attract Ankara’s attention as it seeks to fulfill its broader objectives in the realm of Pan-Turkism. Consequently, Ankara is unlikely to exhibit significant eagerness or enthusiasm for extensive collaboration with the Taliban government until this aim is realized, resulting in a predominantly one-sided engagement in diplomatic relations.
